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Abstract 
Voice call transmissions on cellular networks are not end-to-end secure and thus, attacks like call tracing, modification etc 
by an adversary is easily feasible, that is, any adversary Eve, can trace the call, and can intercept the voice, which is 
transmitted over an unsecured medium from a user (Alice) to another user (Bob) through mobile phones. Thus, it’s not safe 
to private talk on the mobile phones. In this paper, we propose a scheme, which provides entire security between valid end 
users over the security protection provided by the network system. A common secret key is pre-negotiated between end 
users (many such schemes are available) to initiate the communication. We present a global construction of our proposed 
protocol. In addition to this, we also discuss the security proofs of our proposed protocol. 
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the 3rd International Conference on Recent Trends in 
Computing 2015 (ICRTC-2015). 
 
Keywords: Key generation; hash function; cellular communication; linear-feedback shift register 
1. Introduction 
 
Secure mobile voice communication is an open problem in the field of mobile network security. In 
recent years, several different types of protocols are proposed in the direction of this problem. In year 2004, 
Katugampala, Al-Naimi, Villette and Kondoz [2] proposed a scheme in which they described a real time 
prototype implementation of a system, which enables secure voice and data communication over the GSM 
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voice channel. In year 2005, they [3] proposed a modified version of [2] in which a real-time prototype is 
implemented demonstrating the end-to-end secure voice communications over the GSM voice channel. In year 
2007, Chia-Hui Wang and Mei-Wen Li [11] proposed that a distributed multi-key solution which dynamically 
changes the encryption key based on the Diffie-Hellman algorithm to provide more secure protection for an 
end-to-end VoIP call. In this paper, we propose a quiet simple technique for securing the mobile 
communication using the pre-negotiated common key between end users. We also use the concepts of linear-
feedback shift register (LFSR) [8, 9] in primitive polynomial to implement our protocol. We have also shown 
that our proposed protocol is secure against possible attacks. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes some background ideas about key-
negotiation techniques and LFSR. In section 3, the proposed scheme is presented. The security analyses of our 
scheme are described in section 4, and we conclude the paper in section 5.  
 
2. Preliminaries 
 
In this section, we first introduce about key generation techniques and then we give some background 
on LFSR with primitive polynomial. 
 
2.1 Key-Negotiation Protocols 
 
The first proposed key generation protocol is Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol [1].This protocol allows 
two users to exchange a common secret key between them over an insecure medium described as follows: 
Suppose two users, Alice and Bob willing to exchange a common key for secure communication. Both agree 
upon two numbers g and q, where q is a prime and g is a generator of order q in the group <Zq*, *>.The steps 
are follows: 
 
a. Alice chooses a large random number xa<q and calculatesݑ ൌ ݃ݔܽ ݉݋݀ݍ and sends u to Bob.  
b. Similarly, Bob chooses another large random number ݔܾ<q and calculatesݒ ൌ ݃ݔܾ ݉݋݀ݍ and sends 
v to Alice. 
c. Alice calculatesܭ ൌ ݒݔܽ݉݋݀ݍ. 
d. Bob calculatesܭ ൌ ݑݔܾ݉݋݀ݍ. 
 
Now both Alice and Bob have the same secret key, namelyܭ ൌ ݃ݔܽݔܾ . However, this protocol suffers 
some attacks like man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack etc. Many other key-generation protocols are proposed in 
account to better security [4, 5, 8, 9, 10 etc].  
 
 
2.2 Linear-feedback shift register 
 
Linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) is a circuit used to generate pseudorandom number [8, 9]. The 
LFSR can be created by using a chain of flip-flops. The linear-feedback shift register is a mechanism for 
generating a sequence of binary bits. The register initialized by the vector secret seed. The behaviour of the 
register is regulated by a clock and the XOR of a subset of the bit contents is placed in the rightmost bit. The 
LFSR can hold the longest period when the polynomial of tap sequence adding 1 is primitive polynomial. To 
obtain the longest period of (2n) −1, LFSR with length n need to find n exponent primitive polynomial in GF 
(2). From the security of cryptography, the longer period is the better option. Leftmost bit is used as a bit of key 
stream and is next input bit. 
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Step 3: At the other end, Bob computes repeated hash of common secret key ĸ continuously and count the 
number of iteration at which, it is equal to the incoming  from Alice and sets the output of i-1 iteration of 
hash into the seed of same LFSR as Alice. So, the content of both LFSRs will be same. 
 
Step 4: The incoming digital message ׋ from Alice is, then XORed with the output of the Bob’s LFSR and 
passes through a DTA converter. Thus, Bob gets the original secure voice coming from Alice. 
 
As a proof of verification, the receiver end computation is݉۩ݔ۩ݔ ൌ ݉ thus original message is decrypted 
by Bob.                             
 
 
However, the proposed protocol uses a pre-negotiated LFSR between the end users and there are several pairs 
of such mobile users who want to communicate securely in the universe. Thus, one common LFSR must be 
used and known to every mobile user for each communication globally which is difficult to implement. To 
resolve this difficult, here we gave a practical construction about LFSR as shown in fig.3. Every mobile user 
has the contact number of her friend in her friend list to call him. Likewise contact number; she also must know 
the LFSRs of each friend with their contact number to construct our proposed scheme i.e. if a mobile user U 
has n friends namely, F1, F2........... Fn, then user U must know about their LFSRs, say, LFSR1, LFSR2........ 
LFSRn. Whenever she wishes to communicate, she must know the contact number as well as LFSR of other 
party. In this manner, we use different types of LFSRs in each pair of communication to avoid a single LFSR 
globally as fig.3.  
 
 
 
 
fig.3. Stucture of proposed protocol 
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4. Security Analyses 
This sub-section addresses the security analysis of our proposed schemes. The protocol is well protected 
against call tracing. Talking about security to our proposed schemes, let an adversary, say, Eve intercepts the 
message in between the communication. Obviously, she gets ׋צ  which is transmitted during the 
communication but she is unable to intercept the original data m because she do not know the common secret 
key ĸ. Suppose, Eve tries to find the content of LFSR using the pattern of data in between the communication 
for a long time, she will be unable to guess because the output of LFSR is not constant and always changes 
from x to x’. Since both, message and output of LFSR is changed repeatedly, the Eve is unable to find any 
meaningful information. Now, if Eve tries to find െͳ using, she will be unable because hash function is a 
one-way function and reverse of hash is not possible.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have proposed a mobile communication scheme which avoids the tracing of voice calls on the 
mobiles networks. The proposed protocol is based on the hardness of LFSR and hash function. The key 
generation techniques in this protocol play an important role to secure the communication. We also showed that 
our protocol is secured under voice call tracing and modification. 
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